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Abstract: To complement the ‘no shared liability’ rule and public deficit limits,  
the Maastricht agreement gave the European Central Bank a narrow remit to 
focus on price stability.  Crucially, as a ‘non-sovereign’ central bank, it was 
that the ECB would act as lender of last resort in the event of market panics. 
The neo-liberal orthodoxy at the heart of EMU held that moral hazard and 
inflationary risks militated against anything resembling ‘illegal monetary 
financing’. Following monetary union, markets underpriced risks and 
encouraged bubbles but sentiment rapidly reversed during the crisis. With 
bail-out funds limited and austerity failing to improve debt spreads, sovereigns 
became illiquid. For Bank officials, an uncontrolled large bank or sovereign 
default rightly became synonymous with the end of monetary union itself.  The 
ECB was forced de facto to expand its mandate to support the banking sector 
and then, more reluctantly, sovereigns facing loss of access to bond markets. 
Ultimately this improved market sentiment but it jarred with the ECB’s own 
neo-liberal economic perspective. Uncomfortable with its interventions, the 
Bank has continued to stress its legal limitations and acted to deepen 
Eurozone commitments to austerity and structural reform packages.  The 
ECB’s actions, whilst safe-guarding the single currency in the short-run, 
cannot however substitute for the deeper political and banking union that may 
be necessary to create stable and democratic Eurozone governance. 
 
Introduction  
 
‘Within our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it takes to preserve the 
euro. And believe me, it will be enough.’ (Mario Draghi, ECB President, 26 
July 2012)1 
 
Given the serious threat posed by the Eurozone financial crisis, it is 
perhaps surprising how far alleged limits imposed by the Maastricht treaty 
have been cited by politicians, commentators and ECB officials in debates 
about appropriate action to resolve it.2 Law has however always been central 
to the methodology of European integration.3  As is well-known, the Euro was 
conceived of as a purely monetary not fiscal union (this latter term being 
understood to refer to some shared debt issuance and a substantial federal 
budget). To assuage fears over the loss of the inflation-control provided by the 
Bundesbank, the European Central Bank (ECB) was given strong 
independence and a narrow mandate to focus upon price stability. Eurozone 
members were legally obliged to adhere to fiscal targets without any 
automatic federal transfers, a common banking union or a designated 
sovereign lender of last resort to maintain their solvency in bond markets. 
Unsurprisingly, during the period 1999-2007 legal mechanisms to enforce 
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fiscal discipline tuned out to be weak and instead financial markets were 
relied upon to price debt to reflect underlining budgetary fundamentals. The 
neo-liberal view was indeed that, so long as the ECB remained aloof, markets 
would correctly allocate resources to rebalance the Eurozone economy.  
This paper considers the evolving position of the ECB. It argues that, 
whatever the legal arguments, a sovereign central bank is the only body than 
can ultimately secure the stability of both private and public debt markets. The 
crisis forced an expansion in the ECB’s remit that was largely shaped by 
political and economic factors, not law. Indeed, given the complexity and 
unpredictability of events during the crisis, no legal rule could have met every 
exigency. Central banks act in this sense sui generis, a fact tacitly accepted 
by the ECB.  As each new phase of the crisis emerged, the ECB gauged the 
appetites of the respective political actors: the ability of debtor countries to 
deliver given levels of austerity and the willingness of creditor nations to 
provide loans to sovereigns.  At least until the Cyprus bail-out of April 2013, 
the ECB showed a cautious willingness to bridge political gaps by ensuring 
banks had liquidity (to safeguard credit markets) and reducing sovereign bond 
spreads (to maintain debt serviceability).  
Whilst the Maasticht drafters’ original idea of a narrowly-focused 
central bank, has been partially eclipsed by events, the ECB has continued to 
refer to the so-called ‘ban on monetary financing’ throughout the crisis.  This 
was however never a legal rule but more a reflection of the liberal economic 
doctrine of moral hazard avoidance. This idea, directed at preventing a crisis 
occurring, became problematic once financial panic set in.  To re-establish 
bonds as ‘risk-free‘ required clear promises by the ECB but these clashed 
with its own belief that moral hazard would result, removing pressure for 
austerity and structural reform. The ECB has therefore not uncomplicatedly 
offered accommodative monetary policy to its government(s) - like the 
contemporary Bank of England or the US Federal Reserve - by 
unconditionally providing liquidity and targeting low long-term interest rates. 
Rather it has become a key political actor, conditioning its emergency 
measures on the introduction of new Eurozone legal rules on fiscal discipline, 
economic surveillance and compliance with Troika programmes. To this 
extent, despite all the accusations of abuse of power leveled against it, the 
ECB has endorsed the narrow monetary model of Maastricht. It has not 
pressed for new democratic federal structures to create a deeper political and 
budgetary union; rather its strong endorsement of ‘temporary’ deflationary 
Troika programmes further weakens Eurozone democracy and growth 
prospects. 
 
The Origins of the Crisis 
 
It is widely agreed now that the crisis revealed that the legal order of 
the single currency allowed unsustainable imbalances to build up.4 Economic 
evidence shows that under-regulated capital markets in Europe reflected 
global trends toward excessive risk-taking. In addition, the Eurozone 
experienced internal trade imbalances: trade surplus countries saved more 
than they could invest domestically and trade deficit countries absorbed the 
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excess. Much of this capital flow however took the form of highly liquid 
securitized debt, not long-term foreign direct investment. Whilst some capital 
was employed to raise the productivity of ‘catch-up’ countries, it also funded 
public deficits, consumption booms and asset bubbles.5 Credit spreads 
narrowed across the Eurozone as markets appeared to believe that the legal 
irrevocability of the single currency meant that devaluation and default risks 
were negligible. Astonishingly, despite their very different debt and deficit 
profiles, the spreads for 10-year government bonds converged such that on 4 
July 2006, in relation to the bench-mark German bund, the risk premium was 
only 0.31% for Greece and 0.30% for Italy. After the crisis hit private credit 
markets, capital repatriation began. In the absence of cheap private capital, a 
hard budget constraint returned to banks in deficit countries.  The subsequent 
collapse in asset prices, banking sectors and economic activity felt in these 
countries created or worsened budget deficits. There appears to have been 
an implicit assumption by market actors up until late 2009 that the Eurozone 
would, despite the limited nature of Maastricht, underwrite its Members 
(through the ECB, common bonds or a bail-out fund) to secure banks and 
debt servicing. When Greece was only reluctantly supported,  worsening 
public debt profiles triggered a flight to safety and a sovereign debt panic 
spread across the Eurozone. 
The Maastricht framework was of course designed deliberately to deny 
large-scale fiscal support to Eurozone members. In addition, a political 
narrative developed identifying ‘profligate’ behaviour in Southern Europe as 
the cause of the crisis. Finally, liberal economic thinking promoted by core 
countries, the European Commission and the ECB has consistently 
emphasized the pre-existing legal framework requiring austerity supported by 
liberalising structural reforms. As a result, the political response since 2010 
has been piece-meal, with rescue funds being raised only in response to a 
succession of sovereigns being shut out of access to bond markets. The 
amounts of direct financial support have been modest and have been dwarfed 
by the large and diverse range of opaque transfers made through the 
European System of Central Banks (ESCB). 6  Cheap loans to banks spared 
sovereigns the social and economic costs of sudden bank failures. Eurozone 
members with trade deficits were able to maintain imports and fund private 
sector capital flight.  There has been no traditional balance of payments crisis 
like that which forced the non-Eurozone Baltic Republics into drastic austerity 
to maintain parity with the Euro.  
Centrifugal forces have however constantly threatening to overwhelm 
centripetal dynamics: austerity-fatigue led to fears of default, exit and 
devaluation by nations in deep recession, whilst the direct burden on 
taxpayers of bail-outs (concealing the indirect benefits to the banking system) 
and fear of currency debauchment prompted voices in stronger nations to 
consider abandoning the non-compliant in favour of a smaller monetary union. 
To date, however, political leaders have lacked any vision for a new economic 
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constitution to replace Maastricht. During the acute phase of 2010-12, 
avoiding an uncontrolled default or currency exit was the key objective. The 
fear of a new Lehmann Brothers-style shock was profound. Thus modest 
fiscal transfers and tepid ECB bond-buying were combined with demands for 
structural reform and austerity to restore economic ‘fundamentals’. As capital 
flight persisted and Southern European sovereigns found refinancing 
increasingly costly, the ECB came under greater economic and political 
pressue to openly support sovereign bond markets. 
  
The ECB as Lender of Last Resort to the Private Sector 
 
 The ECB has come to be the key actor during the crisis. This is for four 
reasons:  first, it is relatively immune from political or legal challenges to its 
decisions; second,  Member States, struggling to get national parliaments 
(and taxpayers) to pay directly for bank and sovereign bail-outs, have 
acquiesced in the ECB providing ‘off-balance sheet’ funds that do not feature 
in their national budget figures; third, its legal remit has turned out to be rather 
more flexible than previously imagined; fourth, the interconnectedness of the 
European capital markets meant that, regardless of the intentions of the 
Maastricht drafters, a form of lender of last resort came to be seen as 
essential in practice.7 
 It is, with hindsight, surprising how little attention was given to the 
issue of financial stability in all the debates surrounding the design of the 
ECB.8 Discussion focused upon fact that growth and employment were not 
made core objectives of the ECB. Instead, the primary duty on the European 
System of Central Banks (ESCB) comprising the ECB and the national central 
banks was to maintain price stability. Importantly, unlike most national central 
banks, the ECB had no duty to maintain financial stability but only to 
‘contribute to the smooth conduct of policies’ of national banking regulators 
who still retained ultimate responsibly for prudential supervision of Eurozone 
banks. There was no explicit legal restriction on the ECB acting as lender of 
last resort to the private as opposed to the public sector. It was clear however 
that the ECB was not as well-suited to fulfill such a role compared to national 
central banks whose ultimate source of funding is the monopoly power of 
taxation held by a sovereign state. National central banks cannot become 
insovlent so long as their state is solvent. 9 This also works in reverse: so long 
as it is denominated in national currency, a national bank can buy up 
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unlimited amounts of public debt to ensure that its government’s debts are 
serviceable.  
The ECB by contrast remained reliant upon the limited capital provided 
at the outset by its shareholders – the Eurozone central banks (and their 
governments) - on the basis of the contribution formula agreed at 
Maastricht.10 It had no sovereign guarantee backed by Member States’ 
taxation systems to protect it from financial difficulty.11 This was perhaps 
inevitable given that the Eurozone remained a collection of sovereign states 
not a federal government. As Goodhart foresaw, however, this made the ECB 
closer to the International Monetary Fund than a national central bank; if its 
capital became stretched due to a rescue operation it would have to appeal to 
all Eurozone governments for further injections with all the attendant political 
complexities this might bring.12 There is no provision in the Treaty for any 
such recapitalization. In principle, this design limited the ECB’s ability to 
engage safely in the kinds of lending and money creation typical of a lender of 
last resort. 
 The issue of lender of last resort did not however arise at all for the 
ECB during the years 1999-2006.  When the crisis began in 2007, however, it 
was already received wisdom amongst central bankers that the tight monetary 
policy of 1929-31 that had caused widespread bank failures must be avoided. 
The classical role of the lender of last resort is to lend freely but only to 
solvent entities against good collateral. The aim is to support the illiquid not to 
bailout the insolvent but distinguishing between the two is very difficult in a 
crisis. Particularly after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, 
the ECB interpreted its own mandate to include ensuring financial stability. 
The fact that the initial burden was felt across the whole Eurozone inter-bank 
credit market left the ECB with greater legal and political flexibility to act and 
prevent a chain of banking failures. 13  
It used both standard measures, cutting its main policy rate, and ‘non-
standard’ measures, initially in the form of unlimited loans of up one year and 
even outright purchases of bank debt securities.   As regards loans, the ECB 
Statute merely states that collateral provided be ‘adequate’. The ECB 
Guideline on Monetary Policy Instruments determines which assets are 
‘eligible.’14 This may be amended by simple majority vote and it is here that 
the real power of the ECB Governing Council to manage the Eurozone crisis 
has been located.  Agreeing to accept an asset class as eligible collateral 
creates economic implications not just for the many banks holding such 
assets, but also their governments, their citizens and taxpayers across the 
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Eurozone. The Maastricht treaty however left such decisions entirely up to the 
discretion of the national central banks and the ECB Executive Board that 
make up the Governing Council. These votes are governed by ‘one member, 
one vote‘ on this issue, rather than any weighting of votes by capital 
contribution. In fact, despite some German members’ dissents, there has 
been a remarkable degree of consensus on the Governing Board. 
   Although liberal economists worried about the moral hazard of 
protecting bank creditors, there was however no immediate doubt raised 
about the legality of the ECB acting as lender of last resort to the private 
sector during 2007-9. The ECB had been seen to pass its first real test. The 
ECB reassured the potential critics that the quality of the assets it had taken 
onto its balance sheet was sound and that there was little credit risk for its 
shareholder Member States. Indeed by summer 2009, the ECB President was 
already promising an exit strategy through winding down of the Bank’s 
liquidity support whilst urging Member States to ‘prepare and communicate 
ambitious and realistic fiscal exit and consolidation strategies…’15 This 
mirrored the Commission’s recommencement of procedures to restore the 
fiscal benchmarks of the Stability and Growth Pact across the Eurozone. For, 
markets however, as we shall below, the return to ‘business as usual’ for 
sovereigns was disturbing because it indicated that there was in fact no 
willingness to pool liability at Eurozone level; the Maastricht model remained 
the only one on offer despite very poor growth outlooks and heavy deficit 
burdens. 
Thus, despite early optimism that use of its balance sheet would be 
temporary and confined to ‘classic’ private liquidity provision, the ECB has 
since been forced to continue providing credit to European banks on a large 
scale.  As the crisis developed from 2010 into one enveloping sovereigns, the 
fate of banks and their sovereigns became entwined: in the absence of a 
Eurozone banking union to force bank recapitalisation whilst sharing the cost, 
bank creditors began to fear for banks’ solvency. Weak sovereigns beget 
weak banks and vice versa. The ECB officialy relaxed its collateral standards 
to allow banks to post junk status sovereign bonds in return for liquidity.16 The 
ECB showed that, at least until the Cyprus crisis of April 2013, for financial 
stability reasons, it did not wish to see a major bank fail. It has however at 
times refused to provide credit directly to banks unable to offer even this level 
of collateral. This power to cut off funds to private banks was briefly used on 
two occasions in respect of Greek banks; in February 2012 when Greek 
sovereign bonds were technically in default for one week and could not be 
used as collateral and later, in May 2012, when Greece had a caretaker 
government and the ECB refused credit to four banks due its increased fear 
that the government was going to default. On these occasions however 
Greece was still allowed to grant its banks Emergency Liquidity Assistance 
(ELA) to avoid insolvency.17 This is an inherent power of central banks to 
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create liquidity by making loans to solvent banks in return for poorer quality 
collateral. The Irish, Greek and Cypriot central banks have used this 
extensively. In the case of default, the risk lies with the national central bank. 
The legal constraints on ELA are opqaue but ultimately lie with the 
ECB Governing Council which may -by 2/3 majority - veto a proposed loan of 
ELA if it will ‘interfere with the tasks and objectives of the ESCB’ (Article 14.4 
ESCB Statute). This is ambiguous but the ECB has indicated its opinion to the 
effect that such funds must only be granted to solvent institutions and must be 
repaid rapidly.18 The concern is that if banks receive central bank money 
(which does not form part of the national debt) the sovereign in effect benefits 
by monetary financing of its activities in breach of the Maastricht prohibition 
on such financing. The legally correct approach to insolvent banks is to 
recapitalize them from central funds - which does feature as increased 
government debt. Thus the ECB monitors carefully all ELA to ensure it is truly 
a valid loan which is being repaid.  
The ECB has used negotiations around ELA on several occasions to 
ensure compliance with its views on Eurozone economic governance. 
Decisions on ELA in fact became linked to bail-out packages. Thus in 2010, 
during its bail-out negotiations, when Ireland said that it was going to allow 
Anglo-Irish, an insolvent bank, to default and write-off bond holders, the ECB 
and the European Commission opposed this. As a condition for the bail-out, 
they insisted that Irish banks instead use ELA to pay-off their creditors. The 
problem was, as a result, that Irish taxpayers had to honour the large 
government debts on onerous terms (‘promissory notes’) which had 
previously been pledged as security for the initial grant of ELA. In effect, Irish 
taxpayers were indirectly bailing out reckless creditors, mainly banks in 
France, Germany and the UK, who had bet on Ireland’s property bubble 
persisting. The ECB feared that a default would bring about another Lehman 
Brothers-style shock.19 
 The perception of risk had changed by 2013 when Cyprus, faced with 
huge bank recapitalisation costs (caused by the earlier Greek debt write-
down), was negotiating its bail-out. The parameters had largely been set 
when German parliamentarians refused to authorise sufficent bail-out funds to 
protect all depositors (many of whom were Russian nationals).  With no 
agreement forthcoming, the ECB forced the issue when it ruled that the 
central bank of Cyprus could no longer grant ELA to Laiki bank because it 
was insolvent and needed to be run down unless it was substantially 
recapitalised by the government. Without ELA, the bank would have been 
pushed into liquidation within days. This forced Cyprus to accept the terms of 
the Troika package which necessitated that depositors in the country’s two 
main banks bore losses of up to 60% on their savings.  
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This was a milestone because it saw the ECB, for the first time since 
2008, actually use its legal powers over money issuance to impose write-
downs on the private sector and, in effect, force a large bank to close. The 
use of legal limits on liquidity provision also meant that Cyprus had to agree to 
a package of austerity set out by the Troika in order to avoid immediate 
default.  This however raised fresh doubts over the status of depositors’ funds 
across the Eurozone and opened up the possibility of future capital flight in 
the absence of a functioning Eurozone banking union to guarantee deposits.20  
The ECB seems to have believed that Cyprus would not leave the Eurozone 
because it would face severe budget cuts, bankrupticies and depositor losses 
in any event.  Additionally, the Cypriot government, faced with a bank run, 
was forced to introduce capital controls which prevented cross-border 
payments. Cypriot euros were no longer the same as those in other Eurozone 
members; the ‘single’ currency was in effect suspended.  The management of 
the Cypriot bail-out confirmed that there was no implicit Eurozone guarantee 
for depositors fearful about bank or government solvency.  
 
The ECB as Lender of Last Resort to Sovereigns 
 
The need for central banks (or international lenders like the IMF) to act 
as lender of last resort to sovereigns is accepted by many economists and 
policy-makers.21 Panics in bond markets can cause illiquidity and drive up 
yields creating solvency problems.  Unlike for banks, the solvency of nations 
is however a largely political - not economic - question. Here it is important to 
distinguish between nations borrowing in their own sovereign currency from 
those which issue loans in a foreign currency or tie their domestic currency to 
gold or dollars. The former can always, at some risk of inflation, monetarize 
their liabilities by borrowing from their central bank. Sometimes this may 
involve the central bank simply crediting the Treasury with funds; most 
governments instead create a ‘rule’ that they should at least issue bonds 
which are then bought by the central bank in volume to control interest 
rates.22 By contrast, for ‘non-sovereign’ nations seeking foreign currency from 
an international lender of last resort, ‘solvency’ is measured by assessing the 
extent of their political ability to impose given levels of austerity. As stated 
above, the Maastricht agreement was predicated on limiting the ECB’s 
capacity (or willingness) to act as lender of last resort to sovereigns. Eurozone 
members facing a fiscal crisis could only seek direct loans from the IMF (and 
later, the Eurozone rescue funds) with conditionality attached. This meant 
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that, in giving up their currencies, the Eurozone members became like 
developing countries who borrow in foreign currency.  
This was unsurprising as it was a key philosophical tenet of those 
drafting the Maastricht treaty that monetary financing of public debts must be 
prevented. The German experience of the Weimar hyperinflation was allied 
with the wider European experience of the inflationary 1970s. As the 
European Monetary Institute, the precursor to the ECB, put it: ‘Historical as 
well as recent experience has shown that a monetary policy oriented towards 
price stability may be jeopardized by the involvement of central banks in 
financing government budgets’.23 Thus, in addition to providing strong 
guarantees of central bank independence from political interference, Article 
123 TFEU actually banned the ESCB from both providing credit facilities to 
public bodies and also the ‘purchase directly from them….of debt instruments’ 
(Italics added).  This was confirmed in Article 21 of the ECB Statute.24  
European central bankers at the time believed that this ‘very clearly provided 
that the central bank is not allowed to finance the deficit in the public sector’.25 
As well as combating inflation, the prohibition would help to prevent moral 
hazard. The European Commission believed that only an absolute prohibition 
clause could persuade the markets that no solidarity measures would be 
undertaken.26 
Despite these ideas, the so-called ‘no bail-out clause’ did not however 
outlaw purchases of government debt in the secondary market. It was 
foreseen that it might be necessary to buy up such debt to provide liquidity as 
part of traditional open market operations.  To this extent, there was therefore 
never an absolute ban on such purchases. Rather, it was the purpose and 
effect of such purchases that had to be reconciled with the overriding duties of 
the ESCB. The legal position rested upon complex questions of interpretation. 
Whilst there was a widespread political and economic belief that the ECB 
should not ‘monetarize public debt’, some sovereign debt purchases would 
not fall within this concept. Indeed, as the ECB’s remit has expanded de facto 
to include ensuring financial stability, sovereign debt purchases to secure this 
end, rather than to finance government spending per se, would arguably be 
lawful.   
The ECB first tested the legal limits of Article 123 in May 2010, when, 
as part of the overall bail-out package of austerity and structural reform,  it 
revealed that it had agreed to buy €40 billion of Greek sovereign debt (at a 
large discount) on the secondary market. This was explained on that basis of 
‘severe tensions in certain market segments’ which were ‘hampering the 
monetary policy transmission mechanism.’  At the same time it announced 
that it was beginning a Securities Market Program to buy up securities rather 
than simply hold them as collateral to support loans to banks. The voting 
procedure in the Governing Council on this issue, again, is not weighted by 
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capital contribution but rather proceeds by simple majority. 27Axel Weber and 
Jurgen Stark, the German members of the Council voted against the decision 
purchase of Greek bonds on the grounds that it was outside the ECB’s legal 
remit.  
The exact purpose of these purchases remains unclear: the Governing 
Council did not explain how they contributed to either the primary legal 
mandate of achieving price stability or its emerging role to protect financial 
stability. Of course, the risk of Greece defaulting and leaving the Euro would 
have presented a massive financial shock.  Similarly, contagion spreading to 
other sovereigns from Greece might have led to deflation and bank failures 
across the Eurozone. The ECB might have openly referred to such systemic 
risks. The purchase of Greek bonds from a down-graded sovereign that would 
certainly have defaulted apart from the bailout package was risky. There were 
grave doubts (subsequently vindicated) about Greece being able to achieve 
debt sustainability. Even with the ECB being part of the Troika, Greece 
persistently failed to comply with its adjustment programme. It seems most 
likely that the ECB was seeking to share the burden with the Eurozone 
members who faced political constraints on the size of their bail-out 
contributions. In the absence of clarification, it was open to critics to say that 
the purchases were simply illegal attempts to support Greek public finances.  
Similar purchases were however made at the time of the subsequent 
Irish and Portuguese bail-outs. Further interventions to buy Italian and 
Spanish bonds occurred during market stresses in summer 2011, this time 
without any Troika program to enforce austerity and reform. Whilst these 
purchases did, at least for a time, reduce bond yields on government debt 
across the Eurozone, the uncertainty surrounding the legal basis and intention 
behind them satisfied no-one: markets were insufficiently reassured whilst 
hawkish critics still alleged that the Maastricht settlement was being 
undermined by the ECB. The only route to legally challenge the ECB’s 
decisions is however through direct annulment proceedings. Locus standi is 
reserved to the EU institutions and Member States who have privileged 
access.28 Any hint of such a challenge would of course bring financial chaos 
such that no Member State would be likely to commence it. In the event, 
Weber and Stark later resigned from the ECB Executive Board because of 
what they saw as its illegitimate actions. 
  Much more important in practice even than the direct bond purchases 
was the Governing Council’s decision, apparently taken as part of the bail-out, 
to suspend its collateral rules. Banks could continue to obtain short-term 
credit by posting Greek sovereign debt even though this had been down-
graded to junk status by ratings agencies.29 The ECB took similar steps as 
part of the bail-out packages in relation to Ireland and then Portugal. Without 
such loans, these banks would have failed and their sovereigns would have 
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had to exit the Eurozone to restart their banking systems with national 
currency. Creditors in other Member States, particularly Northern European 
banks, would have borne substantial losses.  Public spending cuts would 
have been more painful than the austerity packages agreed with the Troika of 
IMF, ECB and European Commission. The ECB’s generous credit facility 
therefore suited both the stronger Eurozone members and the countries 
needing bail-outs. This was a political decision that had potential distributional 
consequences: it allowed banks and weaker sovereigns to put risks onto 
Eurozone taxpayers as a whole, who would in practice, if not in law, have to 
recapitalize the ECB in the event of it suffering losses.  
The ECB became a major creditor to Eurozone governments, holding 
€212 billion of sovereign bonds by May 2012. In addition, the ECB had made 
over €2 trillion in loans backed by collateral (often sovereign bonds) from 
peripheral countries. As noted above, the ECB has only limited capital and its 
own financial independence was arguably put at risk.30  In December 2010 its 
request for an increase in its capital from €5.76 to €10.76 billion was granted 
by the Member States. Its overall balance sheet had by that time grown to 
nearly €2 trillion. Because of its own potential losses and fears for the 
European banking sector generally, the ECB strongly resisted any sovereign 
debt restructuring for peripheral countries. Until the Cyprus bail-out of 2013, it 
repeatedly insisted that all public and private debts be honored. This was 
most obvious when the Irish government was persuaded to continue to 
guarantee most of its banks’ debts in 2010. Legal, economic and political 
doubts about the ECB’s actions also grew during 2010-11 amongst sections 
of German opinion. In response, the ECB pressed Member States to put in 
place a clearer and permanent legal mechanism (beyond the temporary 
European Financial Stability Mechanism created in 2010) to make loans to 
Eurozone members in difficulty.  
The European Council therefore agreed in December 2010 to amend 
the Article 136 TFEU to permit for the first time, not a system of fiscal 
transfers, but the establishment of a stability mechanism to be activated if 
indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole (italics 
added). The subsequent European Stability Mechanism (ESM), although 
endowed with lending capacity of up to €700 billion, requires recipients to 
comply, in principle, with a comprehensive macro-economic adjustment 
program in every case. There is no power for the ESM to simply buy up debt 
in the primary or secondary markets without strings attached and become a 
lender of last resort. If it were given a banking license if could however borrow 
from the ECB by posting as collateral the bonds it purchased on primary 
markets. This would mean it could leverage itself against its capital base to 
become much larger. The German government has however persistently 
refused to permit the ESM being given a banking license even though the 
limited size of the ESM troubled financial markets and weaker sovereigns.  
Significantly the ECB itself issued a legal opinion stating that funding 
ESM would breach the monetary financing prohibition (‘one of the basic pillars 
of the legal architecture of EMU both for reasons of fiscal discipline ...and in 
order to preserve the integrity of the single monetary policy as well as the 
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indepedence of the ECB’).31 The Germany Constitutional Court noted this with 
approval when declaring German ratification of the ESM to be in compliance 
with the Maastricht Treaty principles.32  As regarding lending to the ESM, 
Governor Draghi said that people risked ‘destroying the credibility of [the ECB] 
by asking it to behave outside the limits of its mandate.’33 The textual 
argument regarding the ECB and ESM relationship is in fact inconclusive: 
Article 123(1) speaks of a ban on lending to ‘Union institutions, bodies, offices 
or agencies.’ Article 123(2) however allows the ECB to lend money to ‘publicly 
owned credit institutions’ which could include the ESM. There is a precedent 
here in that the European Investment Bank, a wholly-owned public body of the 
EU, has received loans from the ECB. It is considered a ‘credit institution’.34  
The real concern driving the attempt to constrain the ESM was likely the deep 
philosophical fear of moral hazard and resistance to creating a lender of last 
resort for sovereigns with largely unlimited funds.   
 
National Politics, the ECSB and the Balance of Payments  
 
In 2011, a different source of controversy surrounding the ESCB emerged as 
data was presented by German scholars about intra-Eurozone capital 
movements occurring via the inter-bank payments system.  These critics 
argued the ECB accounts showed forced loans on a vast and uncontrolled 
scale from, inter alia, the Bundesbank to the periphery.35 The ESCB 
payments system ensures that all private bank transfers are settled. This 
takes place in accounting terms through transfers by national central banks to 
and from the ECB. When a Spanish consumer buys a German car, for 
example, the consumer’s bank asks the national bank of Spain to transfer the 
funds.  After making the transfer, the national bank of Spain has a debit on its 
balance at the ECB. The Bundesbank then creates funds in the German 
seller’s bank account. The Bundesbank then has a credit for this amount in its 
account at the ECB. These accounting entries at the ECB are called 
TARGET236 balances. They are recorded as public exports of capital from 
Germany to Spain in balance of payments data. Before the crisis, such 
transfers of liquidity from the periphery to the core were largely re-financed by 
private-sector bank loans from surplus countries.  Thus, Northern Europe’s 
trade surplus entailed a trade deficit in the South which was funded by a 
capital account surplus provided by Northern banks’ cross-border lending. 
The TARGET2 balances were therefore insignificant.  
 As fears of possible bank failure developed, cross-border loans were 
called in and Southern European depositors began to move large sums to 
safer countries like Germany. Current account deficits also continued to be 
run for some time.  With peripheral banks increasingly shut out of private 
credit markets, there was no longer any capital inflow to offset the outflows 
                                                 
31
 Opinion of the European Central Bank of 17 March 2011, 2011/C 140/05, Para 9. 
32
 [207] 2 BvR 1390/12 and others, decision of 12 September 2012. 
33
 Introductory Remarks, ECB, Monthly meeting 5 July 2012. 
34
 Gros, D. and  Mayer, T.,‘Refinancing the EFSF via the ECB’ (2011) CEPS Commentary. 
35
 Sinn, H. and Wollmershauser, T., ‘Target Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The 
ECB’s Rescue Facility,’ CESifo Working Paper No.3500, 24 June 2011 
36
 See European Central Bank Guideline on theTrans-European Automated Real-Time Gross 
Settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2) ECB/2007/2. 
 13 
appearing in the TARGET2 balances. To continue operating peripheral banks 
had to refinance themselves and meet minimum reserve requirements. These 
reserves came, as we have seen, through unlimited cheap loans from the 
ECB or Emergency Liquidity Assistance. As a result of these trends, 
TARGET2 balances at the ECB grew rapidly. By August 2012, the 
Bundesbank credits at the ECB peaked at €751 billion (up from €25 billion in 
2006) which largely matched the debits of the Irish, Spanish, Greek and 
Italian central banks.  There is no obvious limit to the size of these balances: 
so long as the banking system in the periphery has eligible collateral then they 
can continue to grow.37 
Before these developments, the national character of balance of 
payments data within the Eurozone had been seen as unimportant. Since 
2011 however, critics have argued that TARGET2 balances are like forced 
loans from the central banks of Germany, the Netherlands, Finland and 
Luxembourg without repayment terms or collateral. This interpretation has 
rightly been strenuously rejected by the ECB and the Bundesbank.38 
TARGET2 balances do not take the legal form of loans; rather they are merely 
accounting entries that reflect the pattern of cross-border private sector bank 
payments. The profits and losses from the operations of the ESCB are 
distributed between its Members based upon their capital contributions not 
their TARGET2 balances. If the ECB simply made loans directly to 
commercial banks, rather than using national central banks as agents, there 
would be no such accounting entries at all.    
Whatever the nature of TARGET2 balances, they reflected a 
breakdown in the inter-bank funding market  across the Eurozone. The risks 
began to be considered too great for the private sector to advance funds. In 
order to avoid bank failures, the ECB stepped in as lender of last resort. This 
enabled private creditors, particularly in the UK, Netherlands, France and 
Germany, to exit some positions in peripheral assets and transfer the risks to 
the Eurozone public through TARGET2. The ESCB has extensive reserves of 
gold and foreign exchange to meet any losses. In the worst case scenario of a 
major country leaving the single currency (and taking its collateral with it) then 
Eurozone members would probably recapitalize the ECB. This allowed 
Northern banks to escape their bad investments but at the cost of socializing 
the risks of sovereign default without using the official lending channel under 
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the ESM.39 These sums are less obvious to taxpayers and do not appear on 
national debt figures. Nevertheless, the alternative of refusing to continue 
granting credit to peripheral banks would likely have led to pan-European 
banking failures through both direct losses and contagion. Banks would then 
have to be recapitalized by their sovereigns (including French and German 
banks exposed to the periphery). If national central banks could no longer 
create fresh reserves for their banks, then the single currency would then 
cease to exist at all because euros in peripheral states could not be used to 
make cross-border transfers.40 This was first seen in the case of Cyprus in 
April 2013 which had to impose of capital controls following the ECB’s refusal 
to permit further liquidity for Laiki bank.  
 
The Fiscal Compact and the Widening Crisis in Sovereign Debt Markets 
 
By summer 2011 speculation had re-emerged within the single currency: 
instead of currencies, sovereign debts and private banks were the targets.  
Even domestic depositors in the periphery began to move their money to 
banks in core countries. Contagion spread to large sovereigns like Italy and 
Spain, both considered too large to bail out with the existing rescue funds. 
There had never been any previous doubt about the solvency of such 
countries. But with national central banks’ barred from buying public debt to 
control yields and calm markets, illiquidity was transforming into insolvency41. 
The weakening in sovereign debt markets had a feedback onto banks in those 
countries who were large holders of sovereign debts. Peripheral banks could 
no longer raise long-term debt at reasonable rates. At the same time as their 
share prices were falling, the banks were also under pressure to raise more 
capital to meet Basel III regulatory requirements. 
 Throughout this period the ECB came under increased pressure to 
cap yields by buying more Italian and Spanish public debt. Upon his 
appointment in November 2011, however, the new ECB President Mario 
Draghi very clearly stated that acting as lender of last resort to sovereigns 
was outside the legal remit of the ECB.42  Nevertheless, within a month, he 
said that the ECB might take further action if politicians acted to establish ‘a 
new fiscal compact’ that would ‘enshrine the essence of fiscal rules and 
…ensure that the latter become fully credible, individually and collectively’.43 
He argued that ‘confidence works backwards: if there is an anchor in the long 
term, it is easier to maintain trust in the short term.’ The established ECB view 
was that fiscal indiscipline was a major cause of the crisis.44  It had long 
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argued for deeper constitutional fiscal commitments - principally a German-
style debt brake – not just a modified Stability and Growth Pact, to ensure a 
credible institutional framework for both a return to sound public finances and 
the smooth functioning of EMU. 45 Financial markets believed that the ECB 
was about to abandon its reluctance to cap sovereign bond yields as part of a 
grand political bargain with the Fiscal Compact as the quid pro quo. 
In December 2011 the Eurozone members agreed to the new Fiscal 
Compact which promised cuts in structural deficits to 0.5% of GDP alongside 
more automatic enforcement. The ECB’s initial response was not however in 
the sovereign debt markets; rather it gave unlimited volumes of three-year 
loans to the European banking sector at 1% interest rates. This Long-Term 
Refinancing Operation program was taken up on a vast scale (around €1 
trillion) by banks desperate for liquidity. Again, the ECB continued to accept a 
wide range of collateral. Although, there was no direct purchase of 
government debt, it is probable that the ECB hoped that banks might buy their 
sovereign’s debts – with a carry-trade giving 4-5% on Italian or Spanish bonds 
– driving down yields and rebuilding bank capital. This was the first program 
launched by the ECB engaging in fresh deposit-creation without draining 
liquidity elsewhere - true ‘money printing’. This was again a concern for 
German opinion which saw here signs that the ECB might be losing sight of 
its primary goal of price stability in an effort to secure financial stability. 
The ECB rightly continued to deny that these actions amounted to 
illegitimate monetary financing of public debt. 46 Although they indirectly 
helped governments - by preventing bank failures and lowering yields - 
theyremained in form private loans aimed at maintaining financial stability. 
The LTRO program did however bind domestic banks closer to their 
sovereigns. As foreign investors sought to exit, domestic banks bought up 
their sovereigns’ debts. This increased banks’ vulnerability to shocks through 
any write-downs in their sovereign assets.  It is clear that a crucial collapse in 
the market for much sovereign and bank debt in Europe can be dated to this 
period. Foreign investors were faced with default and exit risks that were no 
longer negligible.  Furthermore, the holders of Greek public debt had been 
twice forced into large write-downs in order to protect official lenders like the 
ECB and EFSF from any losses on their loans. This precedent suggested that 
future rescue operations might lead to further heavy private sector losses on 
other sovereign debts.47  The assets in Europe perceived to be risk-free had 
narrowed to the government bonds of strong Northern Eurozone countries.  
Yields on Spanish and Italian debt fell initially following LTRO but rose 
again to dangerous levels of around 6-7% in summer 2012 whilst Germany 
could borrow at under 2%. In light of continued doubts from the private sector 
about the Eurozone remaining intact, TARGET2 balances had continued to 
grow, despite the LTRO program, with Bundesbank credits peaking in August 
2012 - reflecting continued repatriation of funds and the beginnings of 
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domestic deposit flight from Spain. Spain was faced with the immediate 
problem of funding large-scale bank recapitalisations. In June this required an 
ESM sovereign loan of €100 billion because a direct recapitalisation of banks 
was said by Northern European countries to be illegal under the ESM Treaty. 
Thus, the Fiscal Compact combined with the LTRO programme had failed to 
restore financial stability. The continued refusal of the ECB to cap sovereign 
debt yields directly allowed markets to spread contagion from clearly insolvent 
sovereign debtors like Greece to solvent countries like Spain and Italy. It thus 
increased the likely cost of future rescue packages and deepened the 
austerity needed to pay interest bills, driving some towards insolvency.48 
However with the lending capacity of the EFSF (and its successor ESM) now 
fixed and limited by the Bundestag at around €700 billion, this was not large 
enough to provide immediate funding for the bigger sovereigns in the 
Eurozone. 
 
‘Whatever it takes’? The Outright Monetary Transactions Program for 
Sovereigns 
 
A new phase in the crisis had developed. The LTRO could neither 
remove underlying bank insolvency nor stabilize sovereign bond markets. Just 
as the Fiscal Compact had been used to justify the LTRO programme in late 
2011, the Eurozone leaders’ next important agreement in June 2012 provided 
support for the next dramatic step taken by the ECB. The Eurogroup 
apparently agreed in principle to create a ‘banking union’ ostensibly to break 
the ‘vicious circle between banks and sovereigns’.49 When looked at more 
closely this involved merely a shift in supervisory power from national bank 
regulators to the ECB in respect of larger banks; there was no agreement on 
forcible bank closures or sharing deposit protection or bank re-capitalization 
costs for historic losses. This would have been a form of fiscal union creating 
shared liability whilst limiting national policy autonomy pertaining to the 
banking sector (an autonomy cherished by all Eurozone members in this most 
highly political field). The most that was contemplated was a possible future 
authorization for the ESM (by treaty amendment) to directly recapitalise 
banks, rather than increasing sovereign debt further. 
 Nevertheless, the June agreement was hailed used by the ECB 
President on 26 July 2012 as a major step toward a deeper ‘financial union’. 
In words quoted the world over, he said that the single currency was 
‘irreversible’ and that ‘[w]ithin our mandate, the ECB is ready to do whatever it 
takes to preserve the euro…’ Whilst markets came to focus upon the second 
part of this historic phrase, the reference to the ECB’s mandate were not idle. 
This was made clear in September when the actual details of the new Outright 
Monetary Transactions (‘OMT’) program to replace the failed SMP were laid 
out: it was up to Member States and the ESM, not the ECB, to instigate and 
follow austerity and structural reforms before they could expect central bank 
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support. Whilst the markets were strangely euphoric, the ECB had apparently 
drawn a red line ruling out further bond purchases without Troika 
programmes. 
The OMT program was officially justified by Governor Draghi on a new 
and distinct basis from the SMP, namely that the sovereign interest rates in 
the periphery were elevated in part because the market was imposing a 
currency ‘convertibility’ premium based upon a mistaken belief that some Euro 
members might exit. Once again, the Bank’s primary intention was said not to 
be to finance governments but to disavow private sector actors of doubts on 
this issue. The ECB would buy up unlimited amounts of short-dated sovereign 
bonds to eliminate this risk premium. Furthermore, the Bank would no longer 
claim seniority over other creditors.  
 These two steps were hugely significant but once again the Bank 
feared the moral hazard problem and free-riding by debtor nations. It decided 
that bond market support would only be available to successful graduates 
coming out of an ESM/Troika programme, in the process of regaining market 
funding. The ECB also explicitly failed to say that it would cap bond yields at 
any particular rate, leaving governments uncertain as to the point at which the 
ECB would stop intervening. Finally, the ECB would sterilize all such 
purchases by removing liquidity equal to that injected. These steps were all 
designed to reassure core countries fearful about indiscriminate ‘monetary 
financing’ of the periphery but also because the ECB had lost faith with its 
own ability to press for reforms informally by using bond purchases alongside 
discrete negotiations. The OMT was agreed unanimously by the Governing 
Council, including the German member on the Executive Committee; the sole 
dissent came from the President of the Bundesbank who announced this was 
too close to inflationary and illegal monetary financing of government debt. 
The German government however openly endorsed the legality and prudence 
of the OMT.50  
The financial markets however ignored all the caveats. Without any 
country having to accept its onerous terms, the mere announcement of the 
new policy dramatically reduced spreads on short-term and longer-term 
sovereign debt for all periphery countries, whether inside or out Troika 
programmes. For Italy and Spain, the fall was around 2-3 percentage points, 
allowing for the rollover of debt on politically tolerable terms. TARGET2 
balances also improved markedly with Bundesbank credits falling by 20% to 
reflect private investment flowing back to the periphery and improved export 
performance.51The ECB had shown that merely stating that it could, on 
certain conditions, use its unlimited deep pockets was enough to stabilize 
sovereign bond markets.  
As De Grauwe and Ji show, the previous orthodoxy from the ECB and 
the Commission that only austerity would reduce spreads, was contradicted 
by the evidence. The greatest austerity, in Greece, had in fact produced the 
biggest rise in spreads before OMT. After the OMT announcement, countries 
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with the highest initial spread saw the greatest reduction in spreads.52 Thus 
Greece saw its borrowing costs fall by 10 percentage points. The markets’ 
response indicated that the existence of a lender of last resort, not reductions 
in the level of debt or deficits along pathways ordained by the Commission 
was crucial to calming market panics over sovereign bond yields. The ECB 
had always accepted that market judgments on sovereigns reflected rational 
assessments of the ‘fundamentals’ of debt size, deficit and growth. In fact the 
evidence suggests that during 2000-8 markets moved in a wave of optimism 
on the belief that default and exit were unthinkable by driving down 
sovereigns spreads below their fundamentals. Then, during 2008-12, faced 
with the Eurozone’s lack of commitment to support sovereigns, markets 
swung towards pessimism by driving spreads above the underlying 
fundamentals.53 The ECB’s announcement of the OMT programme stemmed 
the irrational panic, something that countries with their own central banks (but 
worse debt profiles) had not experienced. 
 
Has the ECB Ever Engaged in ‘Illegal Monetary Financing’? 
 
 Even before the OMT programme, there had been allegations that the 
European Central Bank had engaged in ‘illegitimate deficit financing’. 
Because legal arguments are viewed as trump cards over economic and 
political considerations, they often carry great power. Essentially, it has been 
alleged that, apart from its early liquidity provision for banks in 2008-9, the 
ECB’s actions have breached the Maastricht treaty. The legal argument is 
however very weak. As noted above, Article 123 TFEU only prohibits the ECB 
from extending credit to sovereigns or buying government debt in the primary 
market.  So why did it ever become accepted that Maastricht clearly banned 
‘deficit financing’? The answer lies in three further features of the Treaty. First, 
the ECB’s monetary policy mandate, particularly maintaining price stability, 
took legal priority over the Bank’s support for wider economic policy. Second, 
the ‘no shared liability’ clause in Article 125 made clear that neither the Union 
nor its Member States assumed liability for sovereign debts other than their 
own; markets should price debt accordingly. This, combined with the 
obligation to avoid excessive deficits in Art 126, aimed to ensure Eurozone 
members remained solely responsible for their own fiscal policies and subject 
to market discipline. It was widely assumed that these arrangements must 
mean that the ECB could not (lawfully) circumvent this goal directly by 
engaging in large-scale sovereign debt purchases or indirectly by supporting 
weak banks.  And yet it is clear that there never was a rule of law governing 
the matter. It would be more accurate to say that the ‘spirit’ - rather than the 
letter - of Treaty pointed against the ECB acting as a lender of last resort.  
 And yet, in May 2010, this is just what the ECB had appeared to do in 
the case of Greece, to be followed by further interventions in respect of 
Ireland, Portugal, Italy and Spain. The OMT program put such interventions 
on a transparent and formal footing with the trigger being a entry into a Troika 
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programme under the ESM. ECB Presidents have nevertheless always 
publicly accepted that they work within legal constraints and that deficit 
financing is illegal. The difficulty has been to pin down exactly where the 
parameters of legality lie. There is no agreed definition on when a central 
bank is engaging in ‘deficit financing’. The classic case, in which a Treasury 
simply sent its invoices to be paid for by the central bank, is rare. Certainly 
hyperinflations have only generally arisen in such cases, which obviously 
does not fit the ECB’s situation. Without such a definition, however, the legal 
argument has no place to go. The critics have yet to agree on a definition 
themselves, rendering their attacks less convincing. 
 Given that no single legal opinion has set it out, what can we gleam 
from the ECB’s stance over recent years as to where it thinks the legal 
boundaries lie?  The picture is not straightforward, given the complexity of the 
issues. The most important factor emphasized has been the ECB’s intention 
in purchasing debt (or extending credit) rather than the fact of having done so. 
It is a very Catholic idea at heart; the double effect doctrine holds that, where 
one’s intentions are good, this may justify causing a known bad if that is an 
unavoidable and minimally harmful means to secure an overall good.   With 
the creation of the Long Term Refinancing Operation of over €1 trillion to the 
banks in 2011-12, the ECB accepted that these funds would be used to 
support sovereigns by buying up their bonds. It rightly argued that this was 
however an indirect effect and did not amount to illegitimate financing. 
 Under the more controversial Securities Markets Programme, the 
ECB’s argued its goal was to repair the ‘broken transmission mechanism’ in 
peripheral countries; lowering effective interest rates in countries where they 
were elevated above the ECB’s target rate. This was rendered less 
objectionable, by withdrawing from circulation money equal to that spent to 
counter the allegation of ‘printing money’. Finally, the sovereigns supported 
were each under the supervision of the Troika, including the ECB itself, so 
giving a measure of control over the national treasury regarding austerity and 
reform. Any easing of fiscal pressures on sovereigns was portrayed as a by-
product which could not be considered remotely within any definition of 
‘illegitimate deficit financing.’  The subsequent difficulties with the Greek bail-
out revealed that, even within a Troika programme, the ability of external 
bodies to ensure the restoration of public finances was limited in the face of 
recession and resistance.   
 The ECB came under some pressure to accept losses on its Greek 
bond purchases when private sector bond-holders suffered write-downs in 
March 2012. It refused on pragmatic grounds arguing it was a senior creditor 
like the IMF. Later, the ECB said that it would be actually be illegal deficit 
financing for it to voluntarily agree to write-offs of its bond purchases. This is 
because it would result in a ‘transfer’ of funds on a permanent basis to the 
Greek sovereign. The same debate took place when, in February 2013, 
Ireland applied to restructure its own promissory notes (held by the Central 
Bank of Ireland as collateral for loans to Anglo-Irish bank). This time however 
the ECB effectively allowed Ireland to write-down its debts to enable it to 
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better manage its exit from the Troika programme.54 Thus the even the ‘no 
sovereign write-off’ criteria is not entirely certain.  
  In July 2012, when Governor Draghi said he was willing to do 
‘whatever it takes’ to save the Euro it sounded like the prelude to dispensing 
with legal constraints on ECB action. Again however the details of the Outright 
Monetary Transaction programme revealed that the ECB’s new intention was 
to eliminate the irrational ‘break-up’ premium on peripheral sovereign bonds. 
Moreover, although unlimited purchases were contemplated, recepients had 
to be under a Troika programme, thus removing the ECB’s previous flexibility 
to intervene in a more discrete and discretion manner. The complex nature of 
the OMT arrangements, which were created by the ECB’s officials, cannot be 
considered a legal ‘interpretation’ of Article 123. Instead they constitute a 
culmination of the ECB’s political and economic policy position based on 
experience during the crisis.  The OMT programme sought to secure the Euro 
by balancing moral hazard against austerity-fatigue and limits to bail-out 
funds. At one level, it suggested that the ECB had decided to leave political 
negotiations to the politicians; it would only intervene once they had reached 
agreement on the terms of a bail-out and it was being complied with. The 
OMT would however make such negotiations easier in that it guaranteed that 
countries emerging from bail-outs would be given ECB support to keep 
market rates capped at levels consistent with an irreversible monetary union. 
  By always defining its intentions in terms of ‘monetary policy’, the ECB 
has  deflected the legal attack upon it. Any definition of illegitimate deficit 
financing must indeed consider the intention of the central bank in creating 
liquidity. The ECB has no doubt many intentions when it undertakes monetary 
policy but it has always cloaked these in a manner sufficiently linked to 
monetary policy as to shield it from any (unlikely) legal consequences.  The 
ECB’s actions in sovereign debt markets have indeed been far more 
restrained than those of the US Federal Reserve or the Bank of England. Both 
of the latter continue to argue that they are engaged in monetary, not fiscal, 
policy through quantitative easing. Importantly the Bank of England has 
purchased around 1/3 of UK government debt whilst still not being criticized 
by the Commission for breach of Article 123 (which also binds it). Its stated 
purpose is to increase liquidity to drive down wider interest rates (and thereby 
avoid undershooting the inflation target) not to support government finances.  
It has maintained that these purchases are temporary and will be reversed by 
resale to the public at some point.55 Importantly this means, that as a matter 
of EU law, UK government debt cannot lawfully be cancelled, although this 
has been mooted by some as a partial solution to UK indebtedness.56 During 
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the crisis, the UK has had a debt and deficit profile worse than that of weaker 
Eurozone members like Spain.  
 The ECB cannot seriously be accused of having broken any rule of law 
within the Maastricht Treaty through its reluctant and conditional actions 
during the crisis.  The possibility of a Eurozone break-up, something generally 
impossible in a sovereign state,  has had implications for the ECB and the 
Eurozone members. It is clear that because this very possibilty was allowed to 
emerge during 2010-12, panicking markets over-reacted. If a break-up had 
occurred then some of the ECB’s purchases and loans had gone bad, it would 
need recapitalization by the remaining Eurozone members. In addition, the 
remaining Member States would lose paper assets in the form of TARGET2 
loans.  It is not clear that they would however suffer real economic harm 
because their central banks could simply create new money. 57 Furthermore, 
the actions of the ECB allowed Northern European banks to avoid losses that 
would otherwise have required their taxpayers to recapitalise them. Overall 
therefore,it is not clear that the actions of the ECB have cost taxpayers 
anything or that a ‘transfer union’ has covertly been created, rather the 
opposite is likely to be the case. 
 
Politics, Law and Moral Hazard 
 
With the legal constraints on the ECB being more imagined than real, 
what have been the political and economic factors influencing its actions? 
During the first period of the crisis 2007-9, the ECB’s assumption of lender of 
last resort facilities was politically acceptable to most Eurozone states. There 
was general failure of liquidity in private debt markets. The benefits of ECB 
intervention could not be seen to accrue to particular sovereigns, although 
German banks were principal beneficiaries. Since 2010, however, political 
attention has focused upon peripheral sovereign debt markets. As is common, 
the banking crisis was a catalyst for a marked worsening in fiscal positions, 
particularly in countries which had experienced property booms.58  In Northern 
European political discourse, these difficulties were no longer seen as general 
to the Eurozone but reflected particular political failures in Greece, Spain, 
Portugal and Italy which required national policies of austerity, reform and 
wage cuts. The political logic resonated with the orthodoxy about Maastricht 
not constituting a transfer union. For a long time, ECB endorsed this thinking 
by refusing to underwrite sovereign debt yields which market fears had 
caused to sharply diverge.  
Alongside these political dynamics, important German economic 
opinion of the Hayekian and ordo- liberal schools argues that reasserting the 
law on fiscal and monetary discipline was crucial to secure economic 
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adjustment.59 This would force all banks, both in core countries and the 
periphery to realize their losses, although core countries would of course be 
better placed to recapitalize their own banks.  This ultimate ‘grundnorm’ of the 
single currency, allowing market mechanisms to work, was challenged by the  
ECB’s adoption of its new role to safeguard financial stability.60  Whilst price 
stability was maintained, liberal economic critics argued that the vast liquidity 
provided by the ECB had created an illegitimate transfer union, increased 
moral hazard and impeded market adjustments. The private lender of last 
resort function has morphed into a political discretion to prop up weak banks 
and, indirectly, their governments. Continuing to extend such credit merely 
increased the risk of a larger collapse in the future. The ECB should re-
establish strict rules on the collateral and thus curb money creation not 
backed by sound assets.  This has echoes of the gold standard approach to 
money and prices. Certainly, the imposition of tighter limits upon money 
creation would be deeply deflationary and would thus force down wages and 
prices in the periphery of the Eurozone economy. But this might also lead to 
the banking failures and debt/deflation dynamics that central bankers have 
identified as causing the Great Depression and the collapse of the gold 
standard. The single currency might well break-up. 
For the ECB, restoring market mechanisms in finance, whilst 
economically attractive in theory, was unacceptably dangerous.  It fought to 
protect financial stability whilst pushing for the economic adjustments it felt 
were necessary to remove imbalances. Direct exposure by French and 
German banks to securities in the periphery remained significant.  Any 
banking default by a major player61 might well lead to contagion across the 
whole European banking sector.  Similar results would ensure from an 
uncontrolled sovereign default. Sovereigns and their banks remain weak. The 
continued provision of liquidity however prevents the dramatic price and wage 
falls that are the preferred method of rebalancing for the ordo-liberal school. 
The only other adjustment mechanism available under Maastricht 
arrangements was through the enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact 
targets. Nevertheless, the ECB has consistently seen adherence to the Fiscal 
Compact as the only way to exit from its open-ended lender of last resort 
functions.62 
In this regard, although the Fiscal Compact formally reaffirms law as a 
key element to European integration, in practice political processes continue 
to dominate the austerity and reform agenda. Creditor Member States, the 
European Commission and the ECB  seek to reform struggling Member 
States outside the legal framework of the EU Treaties. This new system of 
politics at the heart of the Eurozone represents a significant shift away from 
the rule of law and democracy that has dominated the single market 
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hitherto.63 The previous balancing of market opening against other values no 
longer applies to weaker states faced with severe budgetary problems; 
instead, structural reform, liberalization and austerity must emerge from 
negotiations with creditors.  The ECB had limited faith in this process which 
remains largely political. The persistent failure of Greece to implement its 
Troika program, leading ultimately to default, alongside relucant reforms in 
Italy and Spain, caused the ECB to maintain limits to its sovereign debt 
purchases. As noted above, it is not part of an integrated central bank and 
government.64  It was therefore exposed to potential losses on its bonds that 
would have destroyed its limited capital-base with no guarantee of 
recapitalization.65  Even the planned Fiscal Compact, with its greater 
‘automaticity’ of sanctions, did not on its own convince the ECB to restore its 
bond purchases.66   
Only when forced by markets in summer 2012 did it announce a clear 
path for Eurozone members to receive unlimited bond market support. The 
pre-condition was compliance with Troika programmes and regaining access 
to bond markets.  In this way the ECB strongly endorsed the austerity and 
structural reform model as the path to growth. It also meant the ECB no 
longer trusted Eurozone members to follow this path through exhortation 
alone. The Court of Justice also endorsed this model its judgment in the 
Pringle case where it expressly said that the purpose of Article 125 was to 
ensure that Eurozone members ‘remain subject to the logic of the market.’67 
Action by the EU institutions (including the ECB) or Eurozone members 
through which incentives to conduct a ‘sound budget policy’ is diminished are 
illegal. The Court endorsed the ESM system only to the extent that it would 
impose conditions ‘such as to prompt Member States to implement a sound 
budgetary policy.’68 Thus, for the ECB and the CJEU, moral harzard 
avoidance is at the heart of the Maastricht settlement. Market discipline is the 
norm and conditionality is the panacea for exceptional deviations from this. It 
is this lack of trust that makes the ECB unique: for ‘normal’ central banks 
moral hazard must be ignored; they are servants of their state and must not 
let their Treasury default. They must hope that politicians will adopt the rights 
steps to restore fiscal sustainability. The only possible limit on their lender of 
last resort function would be if it resulted in inflation in breach of their 
mandate. 
Both the ordo-liberal and the ECB’s fiscal disciplinary perspectives are  
at odds with broader mainstream economic opinion that argued that the failure 
to establish at the outset a clear lender of last resort within the Eurozone was 
a serious problem. 69 The ECB appeared to believe for a long time that 
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markets were fully rational in pricing in risk of default and exit and only 
government austerity could change them.  The whole purpose of a lender of 
last resort is however to alter market expectations. Ironically, the 
announcement of the OMT, even with all the conditions attached to it, was 
enough to radically change market sentiment and remove the pressure for 
austerity. The ECB has thereby lost, for the time being, the ability to ensure 
the very austerity and structural reforms that it apparently demanded by 
linking the OMT to Troika programmes. To this extent the risk of moral 
hazard, so long feared by the ECB, has already come about. The response of 
Keynsians is to argue that the whole logic of austerity was always misguided 
and that democratic politicians, not unelected officials, are legitimate to 
question this economic model. Recent economic evidence indeed suggests 
that the economic consensus at the heart of the Eurozone on the need for and 
benefits of short-term austerity is misguided.70  
Reliance on a lender of last resort could not substitute for the failure by 
the Eurozone to agree on a new democratic model of economic governance 
directed at restoring growth and sharing the burden of fiscal adjustment in 
return for necesary structural reforms. In this respect, the ECB’s stance has 
been incoherent: it should either have committed from the outset to be an 
unconditional lender of last resort (forcing the politicians to agree on new 
mechanisms to eliminate moral hazard) or it should have declined to do so in 
the absence of such structures. Instead it sought to solve the moral hazard 
problem itself when it had neither the tools nor the legitimacy to do so.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The legal structure set up at Maastricht failed to insulate Eurozone members 
and taxpayers from fiscal transfers. Integrated capital markets, far from 
disciplining governments and private borrowers, proved to be the primary 
transmission mechanism. Capital markets found the single currency too 
credible and believed that devaluation and default risks were negligible.  
Cross-border lending took on excessive risk, fuelling bubbles and raising unit 
labour costs in the periphery. When credit markets froze in 2008, whilst the 
Treaty did not explicitly mandate it, the ECB expanded its remit to include 
maintaining financial stability by providing vast liquidity to banks.  This 
prevented mass bank failures across all Eurozone members and allowed 
creditors to exit risky positions. This was however viewed by most 
commentators as a legitimate exercise in the classic lender of last resort 
function. 
After 2010, however, the crisis became identified with weaker 
sovereign borrowers and their banks. Although it did buy some government 
bonds, the ECB declined to act openly as a lender of last resort to sovereigns, 
preferring to indirectly channel funds through banks. It argued that legal 
constraints bound it and instead pushed for both larger bail-out funds and a 
tougher legal regime over fiscal discipline. ECB officials remained convinced 
that austerity and structural reforms, not debt write-offs and growth, were 
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crucial for rebalancing. Austerity did not improve fiscal sustainability however 
and default and exit risks came to be seen as non-negligible, causing losses 
in market confidence that pushed up the required level of fiscal tightening.    
Critics rightly argued that the ECB’s drawing of a stark distinction 
between sovereign and private credit was flawed both legally and 
economically. For ordo-liberals, loose money for banks had merely delayed 
bank insolvencies, impeded wage adjustment in the periphery and indirectly 
exposed European taxpayers to increasing volumes of risky assets. 71  On the 
other side, Keynesian critics said that the failure to cap sovereign debt yields 
for solvent Member States endorsed market contagion, worsened the crisis 
and necessitated levels of austerity that lacked political credibility. Faced with 
political limits on both bail-out funds and austerity, the ECB eventually 
relented and committed to unlimited sovereign bond purchases for countries 
emerging from successful Troika programmes.  The effect on financial 
markets was extraordinary; all peripheral sovereigns were able to refinance at 
affordable rates. For all its efforts to avoid this, the ECB may have 
inadvertently recreated the moral hazard problem. 
Despite being a constant point of reference throughout the Eurozone 
crisis, the so-called ‘law’ against funding sovereigns was in reality never 
precise enough to constitute a legal rule. Central banks, including the ECB, 
being political organs fundamental to the survival of nations (and currencies), 
must operate largely beyond the reach of law as conventionally understood. 
Indeed, the ECB has used the very uncertainty of its legal mandate as a 
flexible tool both to reassure its North European critics and to discipline 
struggling peripheral nations seeking its largesse. In the hands of the ECB, 
the ‘law’ means more or less what the Bank says it means, and it has used 
this power to try to mould the Eurozone in its preferred image.  Thus, 
throughout the crisis, the ECB has always championed the existing Maastricht 
model and pressed for deeper legal commitments to austerity and structural 
reform.  Its interventions were reluctant deviations from the discipline of the 
market. To the extent that bond markets were calmed, the ECB may have 
prevented an immediate exit by one or more Eurozone members but delayed 
the necessary longer-term political agreements on debts write-offs, common 
bond issuance, shared budgetary responsibility and bank resolution systems. 
Furthermore, moral hazard is a real danger with politicians in weaker 
countries. Without the development of broader pan-Eurozone democratic 
structures to commit to growth, burden-sharing and structural reform, the 
system will remain very unstable, with long-term austerity a fragile form of 
governance.  
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